Pass the HP ACA - Network Security HPE6-A84 Questions and answers with ExamsMirror

This is because network forensics relies on the analysis of network traffic data, which is often time-stamped by the devices that generate or transmit it. Having a synchronized and accurate clock across all network devices helps to establish a reliable timeline of events and correlate different sources of evidence12

A. Enable BPDU protection and loop protection on edge switch ports is not related to network security forensics, but rather to preventing network loops and topology changes caused by rogue switches or bridges3

B. Enabling debug-level information for network infrastructure device logs might provide more details about the network activity, but it also consumes more resources and storage, and might not be relevant or useful for forensic analysis. Moreover, debug-level information might not be available for long-term retention or legal purposes4

C. Implementing 802.1X authentication on switch ports that connect to APs is a good security practice to prevent unauthorized access to the network, but it does not directly help with network security forensics. 802.1X authentication does not capture or record network traffic data, which is the main source of evidence for network forensics

 This is because an Endpoint Context Server (ECS) is a feature that allows ClearPass to receive contextual information from external sources, such as Aruba Central, and use it for policy enforcement and reporting. An ECS can be configured to point to the Aruba Central API and fetch data such as device type, category, OS, applications, traffic flows, etc.

An ECS can be used to communicate the information that an IoT client has used SSH to Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM). The ECS can query the Aruba Central API and retrieve the network traffic flows of the wireless IoT devices that are categorized as “Raspberry Pi” clients. The ECS can then filter the traffic flows by the SSH protocol and send the relevant information to CPPM. CPPM can then use this information for policy decisions, such as allowing or denying SSH access, or triggering alerts or actions.

B. On CPPM enable Device Insight integration. This is not a valid step because Device Insight is a feature that allows ClearPass to discover, profile, and fingerprint devices on the network using deep packet inspection (DPI) and machine learning (ML). Device Insight does not communicate with Aruba Central or receive information from it. Moreover, Device Insight might not be able to detect SSH traffic on encrypted wireless IoT devices without decrypting it first.

C. On Central configure APs and gateways to use CPPM as the RADIUS accounting server. This is not a valid step because RADIUS accounting is a feature that allows network devices to send periodic updates about the status and activity of authenticated users or devices to a RADIUS server, such as CPPM. RADIUS accounting does not communicate with Aruba Central or receive information from it. Moreover, RADIUS accounting might not be able to capture SSH traffic on wireless IoT devices without inspecting it first.

D. On Central set up CPPM as a Webhook application. This is not a valid step because Webhook is a feature that allows Aruba Central to send notifications or events to external applications or services using HTTP requests. Webhook does not communicate with CPPM or send information to it. Moreover, Webhook might not be able to send SSH traffic information on wireless IoT devices without filtering it first.

The Fail Strategy is a configuration option for the IPS mode of inspection on Aruba gateways. It defines the action to be taken when the IPS engine crashes and cannot inspect the traffic. There are two possible options for the Fail Strategy: Bypass and Block1

If you set the Fail Strategy to Bypass, you are telling the gateway to allow the traffic to flow without inspection when the IPS engine fails. This option ensures that there is no disruption in the network connectivity, but it also exposes the network to potential threats that are not detected or prevented by the IPS engine1

If you set the Fail Strategy to Block, you are telling the gateway to stop the traffic flow until the IPS engine resumes inspection. This option ensures that there is no compromise in the network security, but it also causes a loss of network connectivity for the duration of the IPS engine failure1

The scenario requires that the clients in the “medical-mobile” role are denied access to the 10.1.12.0/22 subnet, which is a range of IP addresses from 10.1.12.0 to 10.1.15.255. However, the current configuration in rule 5 has a subnet mask of 255.255.240.0, which means that it matches any IP address from 10.1.0.0 to 10.1.15.255. This is too broad and would deny access to other subnets in the 10.1.0.0/16 range that should be permitted according to the scenario. Therefore, the subnet mask in rule 5 should be changed to 255.255.252.0, which would match only the IP addresses from 10.1.12.0 to 10.1.15.255 and deny access to them as required by the scenario.1

The subnet mask in rule 3 of the “medical-mobile” policy is currently 255.255.252.0, which means that the rule denies access to the 10.1.12.0/22 subnet as well as the adjacent 10.1.16.0/22 subnet 1. This is not consistent with the scenario requirements, which state that only the 10.1.12.0/22 subnet should be denied access, while the rest of the 10.1.0.0/16 range should be permitted access.

To fix this issue, the subnet mask in rule 3 should be changed to 255.255.248.0, which means that the rule only denies access to the 10.1.8.0/21 subnet, which includes the 10.1.12.0/22 subnet 1. This way, the rule matches the scenario requirements more precisely.

EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) is a framework that allows different authentication methods to be used for network access. EAP is used for RADIUS/EAP authentication, which is a common method for authenticating domain users on domain computers using certificates. EAP requires that the RADIUS server, such as ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM), validates the certificates presented by the clients and verifies their identity against an identity source, such as Windows AD. Therefore, the root certificate for the Windows CA that issues the certificates to the clients should have the EAP usage in the ClearPass CA Trust list.

Radsec (RADIUS over TLS) is a protocol that allows secure and encrypted communication between RADIUS servers and clients using TLS. Radsec is used for encrypting all communications between CPPM and the domain controllers, which act as RADIUS clients. Radsec requires that both the RADIUS server and the RADIUS client validate each other’s certificates and establish a TLS session. Therefore, the root certificate for the Windows CA that issues the certificates to the domain controllers should have the Radsec usage in the ClearPass CA Trust list.

The UBT solution requires that the VLAN assignments for the wired clients are done by the gateway, not by the switch. Therefore, the role configurations on the gateways should not have any VLAN assignments, as they would override the VLAN 20 that is specified in the enforcement profile. Instead, the role configurations should only have policies that define the access rights for the clients in the “eth-internet” role. This way, the gateway can assign the clients to VLAN 20 and apply the appropriate policies based on their role1

This is because a parameter is a variable that can be defined and modified by the user or the script, and can be used to customize the behavior and output of the NAE script. A parameter can be referred to by using the syntax self ^ramsfname], where ramsfname is the name of the parameter.

By defining a parameter for the RADIUS server, you can make the NAE script more flexible and adaptable to different scenarios and switches. The parameter can be set to a default value, such as cp.acnsxtest.local, but it can also be changed by the user or the script based on the network conditions and requirements. For example, the user can select a different hostname or IP address for the monitored RADIUS server when they create an agent from the script, or the script can automatically detect and update the parameter based on the switch configuration. This way, the NAE script can monitor statistics from any RADIUS server defined on the switch without hard-coding the server name or IP address in the monitor URI.

A. Use this variable, %{radius-ipV when defining the monitor URI in the NAE agent script. This is not a valid recommendation because %{radius-ipV is not a valid variable in NAE scripts. Variables in NAE scripts are prefixed with self ^ramsfname], not with %. Moreover, radius-ipV is not a predefined variable that contains the RADIUS server name or IP address, but rather a generic term that could refer to any IP version.

C. Use a callback action to collect the name of any RADIUS servers defined on the switch at the time the agent is created. This is not a bad recommendation, but it is not as good as defining a parameter. A callback action is a feature that allows an NAE script to execute a command on the switch and collect its output for further processing or display. A callback action can be used to collect the name of any RADIUS servers defined on the switch by executing a command such as show radius-server or show running-config radius-server and parsing its output. However, a callback action might not be as fast or reliable as using a parameter, as it depends on the availability and responsiveness of the switch and its CLI.

D. Make the script editable so that admins can edit it on demand when they are creating scripts. This is not a good recommendation because making the script editable exposes it to potential errors or modifications that could affect its functionality or performance. Making the script editable also requires more effort and expertise from the admins, who might not be familiar with NAE scripting syntax or logic. Moreover, making the script editable does not future proof it, as it does not allow for dynamic changes or updates based on network conditions or requirements.

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A DNS SAN (Subject Alternative Name) is an extension of the X.509 certificate standard that allows specifying additional hostnames or IP addresses that the certificate can be used for. A DNS SAN is useful for validating the identity of the server or client that presents the certificate, especially when the common name (CN) field does not match the hostname or IP address of the server or client.

In this case, the certificate has a CN of mc41.site94.example.com, which is the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the standalone Aruba Mobility Controller (MC). However, this CN may not match the hostname or IP address that the MC uses for the Web UI or for implementing RadSec with Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager. For example, if the MC uses a different FQDN, such as mc41.example.com, or an IP address, such as 192.168.1.41, for these purposes, then the certificate would not be valid for them. Therefore, the certificate should have a DNS SAN that includes all the possible hostnames or IP addresses that the MC may use for the Web UI and RadSec.