Pass the The SecOps Group AppSec Practitioner CAP Questions and answers with ExamsMirror

This question is identical to Question 52, describing a scenario where a TLS certificate has expired, causing a TLS error message, and asking about the correct course of action. The analysis remains the same:

Option A ("There is no urgency to renew the certificate as the communication is still over TLS"): Incorrect. An expired TLS certificate invalidates the trust model, even if the connection technically uses TLS. Browsers will issue warnings, and users may bypass them, but the lack of a valid certificate compromises security, making renewal urgent.

Option B ("There is an urgency to renew the certificate as the users of the website may get conditioned to ignore TLS warnings and therefore ignore a legitimate warning which could be a real Man-in-the-Middle attack"): Correct. Repeated exposure to TLS warnings due to an expired certificate may desensitize users, increasing the risk that they ignore legitimate warnings from a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack. Renewing the certificate promptly is essential to maintain security and user trust.

The correct answer is B, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "TLS Configuration" and "Certificate Management."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "TLS Security," "Certificate Expiry Management," and "OWASP Transport Layer Protection Cheat Sheet" sections.

Multifactor Authentication (MFA) enhances security by requiring multiple forms of verification (e.g., something you know, like a password, and something you have, like a one-time code) to authenticate a user. It is effective against attacks that rely on stolen credentials, but let’s evaluate its impact on the listed vulnerabilities:

Option A ("Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability"): XSS (Cross-Site Scripting) involves injecting malicious scripts into a web application that execute in the victim’s browser. MFA does not prevent XSS because it occurs after authentication; an attacker can exploit XSS to steal session cookies or perform actions on behalf of the authenticated user, bypassing MFA’s protection.

Option B ("Cross-Site Request Forgery Vulnerability"): CSRF (Cross-Site Request Forgery) tricks a user’s browser into making unintended requests to a site where they are authenticated. MFA does not prevent CSRF because the attack leverages the user’s existing session (post-authentication). The browser automatically sends cookies (e.g., session cookies) with the forged request, and MFA does not interfere with this process.

Option C ("Path Traversal Vulnerability"): Path Traversal allows an attacker to manipulate file paths (e.g., ../../etc/passwd) to access unauthorized files on the server. MFA does not prevent this because it is an application-level vulnerability unrelated to user authentication; an attacker with or without credentials can exploit it if the application fails to validate input.

Option D ("All of the above"): Correct, as MFA is designed to secure the authentication process, not to mitigate vulnerabilities like XSS, CSRF, or Path Traversal, which exploit application logic or session management after authentication.

The correct answer is D, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Multifactor Authentication" and "Application Security Vulnerabilities."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "MFA Implementation," "XSS/CSRF/Path Traversal Mitigation," and "OWASP Authentication Cheat Sheet" sections.

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) occurs when an attacker tricks a user’s browser into making an unintended request to a site where the user is authenticated, potentially performing actions like changing a password. Let’s analyze the request:

The request is a POST to /changepassword with a Cookie: JSESSIONID, indicating the user is authenticated via a session. The Content-Length: 95 and payload (new_password=lov3MyPiano23&confirm_password=lov3MyPiano23) suggest a state-changing operation (password change).

CSRF vulnerability arises when the request lacks a unique, unpredictable token to validate its legitimacy, and the server accepts it based solely on the session cookie. The request includes no CSRF token (e.g., in the body or headers like X-CSRF-Token).

The Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin header indicates the request originates from the samedomain, but this is a browser feature and does not guarantee server-side protection against CSRF from a malicious site (e.g., via a hidden iframe or form submission).

Without a CSRF token, an attacker could craft a malicious HTML page with a form that submits this exact request when a victim visits their site while authenticated to example.com, exploiting the browser’s automatic inclusion of the JSESSIONID cookie. This is a textbook CSRF vulnerability.

Option A ("True"): Correct, as the request lacks a CSRF token, making it vulnerable to CSRF attacks.

Option B ("False"): Incorrect, as the absence of a CSRF token indicates vulnerability.

The correct answer is A, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)" and "Session Management."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "CSRF Prevention," "Session Security," and "OWASP CSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet" sections.

A docker-compose.yml file is a YAML-formatted configuration file used with Docker Compose, a tool for defining and running multi-container Docker applications. Its primary significance lies in orchestrating the deployment of Docker containers by specifying services (e.g., web server, database), networks (e.g., internal communication), and volumes (e.g., persistent storage). An exposed docker-compose.yml file poses a security risk because it may reveal sensitive configuration details, such as service names, ports, environment variables (e.g., database credentials), and network settings, which attackers could exploit to target the application.

Option A ("The docker-compose.yml file is a YAML file that contains the application source code"): Incorrect, as this file defines configuration and orchestration, not source code.

Option B ("The docker-compose.yml file is a YAML file that contains the server logs and user session information..."): Incorrect, as logs and session data are stored elsewhere (e.g., in container logs or databases), not in docker-compose.yml.

Option C ("The docker-compose.yml file is a YAML file that is used to define the services, networks, and volumes..."): Correct, as it accurately describes the file’s purpose and content, including configuration and dependencies, which are critical for Docker applications.

Option D ("The docker-compose.yml file is a YAML file that contains the configuration of load balancers and firewalls"): Incorrect, as it focuses only on load balancers and firewalls, which are specific components and not the primary focus of the file.

The correct answer is C, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Container Security" and "Configuration Management."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Docker Security," "Container Orchestration," and "OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS)" sections.

Asymmetric key encryption (also known as public-key cryptography) uses a pair of keys: a public key for encryption and a private key for decryption (or vice versa for signing). Symmetric key encryption, on the other hand, uses the same key for both encryption and decryption. Let’s evaluate the options:

Option A ("AES"): AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) is a symmetric key encryption algorithm. It uses a single key (e.g., 128, 192, or 256 bits) for both encryption and decryption, making it a symmetric algorithm, not an asymmetric one.

Option B ("RSA"): RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) is an asymmetric key encryption algorithm. It uses a public key to encrypt data and a private key to decrypt it, making it a classic example of asymmetric cryptography.

Option C ("Diffie-Hellman"): Diffie-Hellman is an asymmetric key exchange algorithm. While it is primarily used for key exchange rather than direct encryption, it relies on asymmetric principles (public and private keys) to securely establish a shared secret, so it is considered part of asymmetric cryptography.

Option D ("DSA"): DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm) is an asymmetric algorithm used for digital signatures. It uses a pair of keys (public and private) for signing and verification, making it an asymmetric algorithm.

The correct answer is A, as AES is the only symmetric algorithm listed, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Cryptography Fundamentals" and "Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Encryption."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Cryptographic Algorithms," "Symmetric and Asymmetric Encryption," and "OWASP Cryptographic Storage Cheat Sheet" sections.

A safe password must adhere to security best practices, including sufficient length, complexity, and resistance to common attacks (e.g., brute force, dictionary attacks). Let’s evaluate each option:

Option A ("Monday@123"): This password is weak because it combines a common word ("Monday") with a simple number and symbol pattern. It is vulnerable to dictionary attacks and does not meet complexity requirements (e.g., mixed case, special characters, and randomness).

Option B ("abcdef"): This is a sequence of letters with no numbers, special characters, or uppercase letters. It is extremely weak and easily guessable, making it unsafe.

Option C ("Sq0Jh819%ak"): This password is considered safe because it is at least 10 characters long, includes a mix of uppercase letters (S, J, H), lowercase letters (q, h, a, k), numbers (0, 8, 9, 1), and a special character (%). It lacks predictable patterns and meets modern password policy standards (e.g., NIST SP 800-63B recommends at least 8 characters with complexity).

Option D ("1234567890"): This is a simple numeric sequence, highly predictable, and vulnerable to brute-force attacks, making it unsafe.

The correct answer is C, as it aligns with secure password creation guidelines, a key topic in the CAP syllabus under "Authentication Security" and "Secure Coding Practices."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Password Management," "Authentication Security," and "OWASP Secure Coding Guidelines" sections.

The request is a GET to /dashboard.php with a purl parameter (http://attacker.com). The response is a 302 Found redirect with a Location: http://attacker.com header, indicating the server redirects the client to the URL specified in the purl parameter. Let’s evaluate the statements:

Option A ("Application is likely to be vulnerable to Open Redirection vulnerability"): Correct. Open Redirection occurs when an application redirects to a user-supplied URL without validation. Here, the purl parameter (http://attacker.com) is directly used in the Location header, allowing an attacker to redirect users to a malicious site (e.g., for phishing). This is a classic Open Redirection vulnerability if the application does not restrict redirects to trusted domains.

Option B ("Application is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerability"): Incorrect. CSRF involves tricking a user into making an unintended request (e.g., via a malicious form). This response does not indicate a CSRF issue; there’s no evidence of state-changing actions or lack of CSRF tokens.

Option C ("Application uses an insecure protocol"): Incorrect. The request is made over HTTP, and the redirect is to an HTTP URL (http://attacker.com), which is insecure, but the response itself does not indicate the protocol used for the initial request. The server could be using HTTPS for the initial response; the insecure protocol is in the redirect destination, which relates to the Open Redirection issue, not the application’s protocol usage broadly.

Option D ("All of the above"): Incorrect, as only A is true.

The correct answer is A, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Open Redirection Vulnerabilities" and "URL Redirection Attacks."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Open Redirection," "Input Validation for Redirects," and "OWASP Top 10 (A10:2021 - Server-Side Request Forgery)" sections.

The vulnerability described is anInsecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR), where manipulating the order_id (e.g., 53870) allows unauthorized access to other users’ orders. The fixes proposed by Bob and John aim to obscure the numeric value of order_id to prevent easy guessing or manipulation:

Bob’s Fix (SHA1 Hash): Replaces order_id=53870 with order_id=1ff0fe6f1599536d1326418124a261bc98b8ea1 (SHA1 hash of 53870). While this obscures the original value, an attacker can still attempt to hash potential order IDs (e.g., 53871, 53872) and test them in the URL. If the application directly uses the hash to look up the order without validating the user’s authorization, the vulnerability persists. SHA1 is aone-way hash, but it does not inherently enforce access control.

John’s Fix (Base64 Encoding): Replaces order_id=53870 with order_id=NTM4NzA= (Base64 encoding of 53870). Base64 is a reversible encoding, and an attacker can easily decode NTM4NzA= back to 53870 using standard tools. If the application decodes it and uses the original value to fetch orders without authorization checks, the IDOR vulnerability remains.

Evaluation: Both fixes address the symptom (disclosing the numeric value) but fail to address the root cause: lack of authorization validation. The application must ensure that only the authenticated user can access their own orders, regardless of the order_id format (numeric, hashed, or encoded). Neither fix includes such a check, so the vulnerability persists.

Option A ("Both solutions are adequate to fix the problem"): Incorrect, as neither solution enforces authorization.

Option B ("Both solutions are inadequate and the vulnerability is still not fixed"): Correct, as both SHA1 hashing and Base64 encoding are superficial changes that do not prevent unauthorized access.

Option C ("Only John’s solution fixes the problem"): Incorrect, as John’s Base64 encoding is reversible and does not fix the IDOR issue.

Option D ("Only Bob’s solution fixes the problem"): Incorrect, as Bob’s SHA1 hashing also does not address the authorization flaw.

The correct answer is B, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR)" and "Access Control Best Practices."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "IDOR Mitigation," "Cryptographic Hashing," and "OWASP Access Control Testing Guide" sections.

Symmetric key encryption algorithms use the same key for both encryption and decryption, while asymmetric algorithms use a pair of keys (public and private). Let’s evaluate the options:

Option A ("RC4"): RC4 is a symmetric key encryption algorithm. It is a stream cipher that uses a single key to both encrypt and decrypt data, though it is considered insecure due to known cryptographic weaknesses (e.g., biases in the keystream).

Option B ("AES"): AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) is a symmetric key encryption algorithm. It uses a single key (e.g., 128, 192, or 256 bits) for both encryption and decryption, widely regarded as secure when properly implemented.

Option C ("DES"): DES (Data Encryption Standard) is a symmetric key encryption algorithm. It uses a 56-bit key for both encryption and decryption, but it is now considered insecure due to its small key size and vulnerability to brute-force attacks.

Option D ("RSA"): RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) is an asymmetric key encryption algorithm. It uses a public key to encrypt and a private key to decrypt, making it an asymmetric algorithm, not a symmetric one.

The correct answer is D, as RSA is the only asymmetric algorithm listed, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Cryptography Fundamentals" and "Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Encryption."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Symmetric Encryption Algorithms," "Asymmetric Encryption," and "OWASP Cryptographic Storage Cheat Sheet" sections.

The request is a POST to /dashboard with a payload containing XML data, specifically an xml_foo parameter with a <!DOCTYPE> declaration and an XML entity (). Let’s analyze the vulnerability:

The payload defines an XML External Entity (XXE) with , which instructs the XML parser to fetch the contents of /etc/passwd (a sensitive system file) and include it in the &example; reference. The XML then includes &example;, which would expand to the contents of /etc/passwd if the parser processes the entity.

This is a classicXML External Entity (XXE) Attack, where an attacker exploits an XML parser’s ability to process external entities to access unauthorized resources (e.g., local files, internal network services) or cause denial-of-service. If the application’s XML parser is misconfigured to allow external entity resolution, this attack can disclose sensitive data like /etc/passwd.

Option A ("Path Traversal Attack"): Incorrect. Path Traversal involves manipulating file paths (e.g., ../../etc/passwd) to access unauthorized files. While the attack aims to access /etc/passwd, it does so via XML entity resolution, not path traversal.

Option B ("Server Side Template Injection"): Incorrect. SSTI (Server-Side Template Injection) involves injecting template expressions (e.g., {{7*7}}) into a server-side template engine. The payload here is XML, not a template expression, and targets XML parsing, not a template engine.

Option C ("XML Bomb Attack"): Incorrect. An XML Bomb (or Billion Laughs attack) involves recursive entity expansion to cause denial-of-service (e.g., ), leading to exponential growth in memory usage. This payload defines a single external entity to fetch a file, not a recursive expansion, so it’s not an XML Bomb.

Option D ("XML External Entity Attack"): Correct, as the payload exploits XXE by defining an external entity to access /etc/passwd.

The correct answer is D, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "XML External Entity (XXE) Attacks" and "OWASP Top 10 (A04:2021 - Insecure Design)."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "XXE Vulnerabilities," "XML Parsing Security," and "OWASP XXE Prevention Cheat Sheet" sections.