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In Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC), access control policies are processed top-down—meaning the first matching rule is applied, and the remaining are ignored. Based on the exhibit, Rule 4 (Access Controlled Groups) is likely being shadowed by a broader rule above it that permits web traffic. To ensure restricted users are denied access to mobile phone shopping categories, Rule 4 must be moved to the top of the rule hierarchy.

Cisco SCAZT (Section 5: Visibility and Assurance, Pages 94–97) describes best practices for rule ordering and inspection logic. Moving the specific block rule (Rule 4) higher ensures it's enforced before general allow rules are evaluated.

MITRE ATT&CK is a globally accessible knowledge base that catalogs adversarial tactics and techniques based on real-world observations. According to SCAZT Section 6: Threat Response (Page 113), this framework enables security professionals to map and anticipate adversarial behavior throughout the attack lifecycle. It supports threat modeling, detection engineering, and incident response.

The exhibit shows DNS Block as the reason and lists 10.1.108.100 as the Responder IP, with the Initiator being 10.1.113.7. In Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center reports, the “Initiator IP” is the source of the request and the “Responder IP” is the source of the response. Since the DNS security intelligence engine flagged the traffic, and 10.1.108.100 was the responder, the blocked traffic corresponds to a DNS response from that IP.

Rule 3 denies all DNS traffic from the subnet 10.1.0.0/30, which includes the client at 10.1.0.6. Since DNS resolution is required to resolve www.salesforce.com, this DNS deny rule is preventing the client from obtaining the IP address needed for HTTPS connection. Removing Rule 3 allows DNS traffic from the client, while Rule 4 permits it specifically for the 4.4.4.4 DNS server.

As per SCAZT Section 3: Network and Cloud Security (Pages 70–73), DNS resolution must be allowed before HTTPS connectivity is attempted. Rule priority and traffic dependency should always be considered in firewall design.

Automation of containment and response actions—such as isolating compromised endpoints and applying predefined security policies—is a critical capability of Cisco’s XDR and SecureX platform. According to SCAZT Section 6: Threat Response (Pages 112–117), automating threat containment allows security teams to rapidly limit the blast radius of incidents and improve mean time to respond (MTTR), without relying solely on manual intervention.

The flow data in the exhibit shows multiple short-duration, high-volume HTTPS connections (443/TCP) from IP 10.10.10.10 to multiple destination IPs in the 50.10.10.0/24 network. All flows are 22 seconds long and transfer exactly 1.77M of data. This uniform behavior to a large set of IP addresses strongly indicates a Denial of Service (DoS) pattern, where an internal host (10.10.10.10) is overwhelming external systems in the 50.10.10.0/24 range.

The SCAZT guide (Section 6: Threat Response, Pages 114–117) explains how Secure Cloud Analytics uses NetFlow and behavioral modeling to identify such volumetric threats. Key identifiers include:

Same connection size (1.77M)

Multiple unique peer IPs in a single external subnet

Same destination port and protocol (HTTPS)

Zero TCP connections completed, indicating unacknowledged connections

This matches the behavioral pattern of a DoS originating from an internal host.

Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) includes an “Inbox” tab where detected threats and flagged endpoints are listed. When Duo Trusted Endpoints integration is in place, an endpoint may be denied access if it fails posture checks. The correct workflow includes reviewing the machine’s status in Cisco Secure Endpoint and marking the incident as “Resolved” in the Inbox tab to restore authentication.

This process is described in SCAZT Section 2 (User and Device Security, Pages 44–46) for enforcing endpoint trust with Secure Endpoint and Duo Trusted Endpoints integration.

The screenshot from Cisco ISE shows a configuration of a “File Condition” posture check that verifies the existence and version of the “Srv.sys” file in the System32 directory. This is a known method to validate if a Windows device has received a critical security patch (in this case, one related to protection against the WannaCry vulnerability, MS17-010). Cisco ISE does not rely solely on a patch management system for this type of validation but can use specific file version and path checks. Therefore, the correct posture condition is File Condition.

The JSON configuration shown is missing a specific Layer 4 parameter definition for port 25 (SMTP). Although the protocol (proto: 6, which is TCP) is defined, without specifying the actual port in the l4_params array, traffic filtering will not trigger on SMTP. Therefore, the engineer must add "port": [25, 25] to the l4_params section to ensure traffic on port 25 is blocked.