Pass the Cisco CCNP Security 300-740 Questions and answers with ExamsMirror

The anyconnect keep-installer none command is used to remove the Cisco Secure Client (formerly AnyConnect) from an endpoint once the VPN session ends. This is useful in temporary or kiosk-based access environments. The default behavior retains the client.

This capability is covered in SCAZT Section 2: User and Device Security (Pages 40–44), which outlines VPN session lifecycle management and Secure Client policies.

Policy-Based Routing (PBR) enables routing decisions based on criteria such as source IP, destination IP, or application. To send SaaS traffic (e.g., Office 365, Salesforce) directly to the internet rather than over a site-to-site VPN, PBR must be configured at each site firewall. According to SCAZT Section 1 (Cloud Security Architecture, Pages 18–20), this approach enables secure local internet breakout—commonly used in direct internet access (DIA) architectures.

The SCAZT documentation emphasizes that when Cisco Secure XDR identifies a high-risk threat (e.g., risk score 8 out of 10 for malware distribution, as shown in the exhibit), the first priority is to prevent lateral movement and data exfiltration. The recommended first response action is to isolate the affected endpoint from the network.

Cisco Secure Endpoint and XDR allow you to trigger an "isolate" response directly from the dashboard, cutting off all non-management communication from the compromised device. This preserves the environment and enables forensic analysis before removing malware or taking destructive actions like rebuilding the system.

The Zero Trust model relies on the principle of "never trust, always verify" and includes continuous verification based on real-time data. According to SCAZT Section 1 (Cloud Security Architecture, Pages 14–17), user and device behavior are key elements for continuous verification. Behavioral analytics evaluates deviations from typical activity, such as time of login, geolocation, access frequency, and resource usage to adapt trust levels dynamically. This is central to adaptive access control and risk-based authentication.

In the Cisco SAFE framework, Reference Architectures serve as blueprints that logically arrange security technologies and capabilities to specific business goals and network use cases. These architectures integrate technologies across domains (e.g., cloud, endpoint, branch) and reflect best practices for layered security.

SCAZT Section 1 (Cloud Security Architecture, Pages 13–15) states that Reference Architectures are built from Secure Domains and Places in the Network, offering a structured approach to threat defense.

Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) is the central policy engine for posture assessments. As outlined in the SCAZT guide (Section 2: User and Device Security, Pages 39–44), to implement posture assessment and client provisioning correctly, an administrator must create posture policies within Cisco ISE and configure the Network Access Device (NAD)—such as a switch, WLC, or firewall—for redirection. This redirection sends the user to the posture portal, where ISE verifies the Secure Client modules (such as AnyConnect) and enforces compliance with antivirus signatures and OS updates.

ISE evaluates endpoint health based on pre-defined compliance rules and supports automatic remediation via the client provisioning portal. This ensures consistency and policy enforcement across distributed environments.

The provided JSON-like policy structure shows a segmentation rule with action "BLOCK" and filters referencing the HTTPS Consumer and HTTPS Provider. However, to block HTTP, you must define the protocol explicitly in the parameters. The attribute “l4_params” is currently empty. According to Cisco Secure Workload best practices (SCAZT Section 4: Application and Data Security, Pages 88–91), Layer 4 parameters (l4_params) must be used to specify protocols such as HTTP or port 80. Without defining HTTP here, the policy does not apply to HTTP traffic.

The Secure Cloud Analytics alert indicates suspicious heartbeat-based connections from an internal server (ip-10-201-0-16) to multiple suspicious IPs over UDP/port 53 (DNS). This behavior suggests command-and-control (C2) activity or botnet communications.

B: Alerting the incident response (IR) team is a critical next step in escalating a verified threat as per SCAZT Section 6 (Threat Response, Pages 114–117).

D: Blocking the identified malicious IPs on perimeter firewalls or network access control devices is an appropriate containment step to disrupt communication.

Reinstallation (A/E) is premature without a full forensic investigation. Validating IDS logs (C) is useful but not immediate response-focused compared to actions B and D.