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Weaponization

The adversary analyzes the data collected in the previous stage to identify the

vulnerabilities and techniques that can exploit and gain unauthorized access to the

target organization. Based on the vulnerabilities identified during analysis, the adversary

selects or creates a tailored deliverable malicious payload (remote-access malware

weapon) using an exploit and a backdoor to send it to the victim. An adversary may

target specific network devices, operating systems, endpoint devices, or even

individuals within the organization to carry out their attack. For example, the adversary

may send a phishing email to an employee of the target organization, which may include a malicious attachment such as a virus or worm that, when downloaded, installs a backdoor on the system that allows remote access to the adversary. The following are the activities of the adversary: o Identifying appropriate malware payload based on the analysis o Creating a new malware payload or selecting, reusing, modifying the available malware payloads based on the identified vulnerability

o Creating a phishing email campaign o Leveraging exploit kits and botnets

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kill_chain

The Cyber Kill Chain consists of 7 steps: Reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, installation, command and control, and finally, actions on objectives. Below you can find detailed information on each.

1. Reconnaissance: In this step, the attacker/intruder chooses their target. Then they conduct in-depth research on this target to identify its vulnerabilities that can be exploited.

2. Weaponization: In this step, the intruder creates a malware weapon like a virus, worm, or such to exploit the target's vulnerabilities. Depending on the target and the purpose of the attacker, this malware can exploit new, undetected vulnerabilities (also known as the zero-day exploits) or focus on a combination of different vulnerabilities.

3. Delivery: This step involves transmitting the weapon to the target. The intruder/attacker can employ different USB drives, e-mail attachments, and websites for this purpose.

4. Exploitation: In this step, the malware starts the action. The program code of the malware is triggered to exploit the target’s vulnerability/vulnerabilities.

5. Installation: In this step, the malware installs an access point for the intruder/attacker. This access point is also known as the backdoor.

6. Command and Control: The malware gives the intruder/attacker access to the network/system.

7. Actions on Objective: Once the attacker/intruder gains persistent access, they finally take action to fulfill their purposes, such as encryption for ransom, data exfiltration, or even data destruction.

STP prevents bridging loops in a redundant switched network environment. By avoiding loops, you can ensure that broadcast traffic does not become a traffic storm.

STP is a hierarchical tree-like topology with a “root” switch at the top. A switch is elected as root based on the lowest configured priority of any switch (0 through 65,535). When a switch boots up, it begins a process of identifying other switches and determining the root bridge. After a root bridge is elected, the topology is established from its perspective of the connectivity. The switches determine the path to the root bridge, and all redundant paths are blocked. STP sends configuration and topology change notifications and acknowledgments (TCN/TCA) using bridge protocol data units (BPDU).

An STP attack involves an attacker spoofing the root bridge in the topology. The attacker broadcasts out an STP configuration/topology change BPDU in an attempt to force an STP recalculation. The BPDU sent out announces that the attacker’s system has a lower bridge priority. The attacker can then see a variety of frames forwarded from other switches to it. STP recalculation may also cause a denial-of-service (DoS) condition on the network by causing an interruption of 30 to 45 seconds each time the root bridge changes. An attacker using STP network topology changes to force its host to be elected as the root bridge.

switch

https://search.arin.net/rdap/?query=199.43.0.43

Just like any other service that accepts usernames and passwords for logging in, AWS users are vulnerable to social engineering attacks from attackers. fake emails, calls, or any other method of social engineering, may find yourself with an AWS users’ credentials within the hands of an attacker.

If a user only uses API keys for accessing AWS, general phishing techniques could still use to gain access to other accounts or their pc itself, where the attacker may then pull the API keys for aforementioned AWS user.

With basic opensource intelligence (OSINT), it’s usually simple to collect a list of workers of an organization that use AWS on a regular basis. This list will then be targeted with spear phishing to do and gather credentials. an easy technique may include an email that says your bill has spiked 500th within the past 24 hours, “click here for additional information”, and when they click the link, they’re forwarded to a malicious copy of the AWS login page designed to steal their credentials.

An example of such an email will be seen within the screenshot below. it’s exactly like an email that AWS would send to you if you were to exceed the free tier limits, except for a few little changes. If you clicked on any of the highlighted regions within the screenshot, you’d not be taken to the official AWS web site and you’d instead be forwarded to a pretend login page setup to steal your credentials.

These emails will get even more specific by playing a touch bit additional OSINT before causing them out. If an attacker was ready to discover your AWS account ID on-line somewhere, they could use methods we at rhino have free previously to enumerate what users and roles exist in your account with none logs contact on your side. they could use this list to more refine their target list, further as their emails to reference services they will know that you often use.

For reference, the journal post for using AWS account IDs for role enumeration will be found here and the journal post for using AWS account IDs for user enumeration will be found here.

During engagements at rhino, we find that phishing is one in all the fastest ways for us to achieve access to an AWS environment.