Pass the ECCouncil CEH v13 312-50v13 Questions and answers with ExamsMirror

When a user encrypts plaintext with PGP, PGP first compresses the plaintext. The session key works with a very secure, fast conventional encryption algorithm to encrypt the plaintext; the result is ciphertext. Once the data is encrypted, the session key is then encrypted to the recipient's public key

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy

Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) is an encryption program that provides cryptographic privacy and authentication for data communication. PGP is used for signing, encrypting, and decrypting texts, e-mails, files, directories, and whole disk partitions and to increase the security of e-mail communications.

PGP encryption uses a serial combination of hashing, data compression, symmetric-key cryptography, and finally public-key cryptography; each step uses one of several supported algorithms. Each public key is bound to a username or an e-mail address.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography

Public key encryption uses two different keys. One key is used to encrypt the information and the other is used to decrypt the information. Sometimes this is referred to as asymmetric encryption because two keys are required to make the system and/or process work securely. One key is known as the public key and should be shared by the owner with anyone who will be securely communicating with the key owner. However, the owner’s secret key is not to be shared and considered a private key. If the private key is shared with unauthorized recipients, the encryption mechanisms protecting the information must be considered compromised.

Out-of-band SQL injection occurs when an attacker is unable to use an equivalent channel to launch the attack and gather results. … Out-of-band SQLi techniques would believe the database server’s ability to form DNS or HTTP requests to deliver data to an attacker. Out-of-band SQL injection is not very common, mostly because it depends on features being enabled on the database server being used by the web application. Out-of-band SQL injection occurs when an attacker is unable to use the same channel to launch the attack and gather results.

Out-of-band techniques, offer an attacker an alternative to inferential time-based techniques, especially if the server responses are not very stable (making an inferential time-based attack unreliable).

Out-of-band SQLi techniques would rely on the database server’s ability to make DNS or HTTP requests to deliver data to an attacker. Such is the case with Microsoft SQL Server’s xp_dirtree command, which can be used to make DNS requests to a server an attacker controls; as well as Oracle Database’s UTL_HTTP package, which can be used to send HTTP requests from SQL and PL/SQL to a server an attacker controls.

When using exploits, you might gain access as only a local user. This limits what you can do on the target machine. You can use Meterpreters 'getsystem` command (https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-payloads/blob/master/c/meterpreter/source/extensions/priv/elevate.c#L70) to elevate your permissions from a local administrator to SYSTEM. This works by using three elevation techniques.

The correct answer is A, Worm-like propagation. In CEH malware-threat concepts, a worm is malware that self-replicates and uses a computer network to send copies of itself to other systems without requiring human action. CEH-related material describes worms as self-replicating malware that use networks to spread to other systems and commonly consume resources while duplicating themselves. The scenario specifically says attackers exploit SMBv1 to spread malware across hosts, which matches worm behavior because the malware moves laterally from one vulnerable machine to another through a network service. This behavior is commonly associated with attacks such as WannaCry, where an SMBv1 vulnerability was weaponized so the malware could scan for vulnerable systems and spread via SMB after infection. Phishing involves tricking users through messages or websites, credential stuffing uses reused username/password pairs, and DoS focuses on denying availability. Since the key behavior is automated spreading across hosts through SMBv1, the best answer is worm-like propagation.

When standard protections such as HTTPS, HTTP-only flags, and session regeneration are properly implemented, CEH teaches that predictable session identifiers become one of the few remaining avenues for session hijacking. Session token prediction involves analyzing entropy, randomness, or generation patterns within session IDs to mathematically infer future or valid tokens. If the application uses weak randomization algorithms, insufficient entropy sources, or predictable sequences, attackers may generate a valid session ID without direct interception. Techniques such as MitM interception or CSRF manipulation do not bypass strong transport-layer protections and cookie restrictions. Session fixation fails because the application regenerates the session ID upon login, invalidating pre-set identifiers. Therefore, the advanced and CEH-aligned method to hijack a protected session is predicting session IDs through side-channel or pattern analysis.

In CEH v13 Malware Threats, BITS is highlighted as a legitimate Windows service frequently abused by attackers for stealthy command-and-control (C2) communication and data exfiltration. BITS is designed to transfer files in the background using idle bandwidth, primarily for Windows Updates and Microsoft services.

Attackers exploit BITS because its traffic closely resembles legitimate Windows update traffic, which is almost always allowed through firewalls, proxies, and endpoint security controls. This makes malicious traffic blend seamlessly into normal network activity, significantly reducing the likelihood of detection.

Option C correctly captures this behavior. BITS does not rely on IP fragmentation (Option A), DNS encryption (Option B), or exclusive HTTP tunneling (Option D). Instead, it leverages trusted system behavior and signed binaries, allowing malware to “live off the land.”

CEH v13 stresses that abuse of trusted services like BITS is a hallmark of advanced persistent threats (APTs) and fileless malware. Detecting such abuse typically requires behavioral monitoring rather than signature-based detection.

Thus, Option C is correct.

In CEH v13 Reconnaissance Techniques, passive monitoring of competitors’ online presence is a legitimate and effective intelligence-gathering activity. One of the most efficient tools for this purpose is Google Alerts.

Google Alerts allow analysts to receive automated notifications when new content containing specific keywords—such as company names, products, or executives—is indexed online. This enables continuous, passive surveillance without repeatedly visiting websites manually.

Option B directly addresses the analyst’s goal of staying updated efficiently.

Option A is illegal and unethical.

Option C involves direct interaction, which may reveal the analyst’s presence.

Option D provides anonymity but does not actively monitor changes.

CEH v13 strongly encourages automation in reconnaissance to reduce noise, effort, and detection risk. Therefore, Option B is the correct and CEH-aligned answer.

OSINT-based reconnaissance includes using search engines to identify publicly exposed cloud assets. CEH highlights Google dorking as a passive method to reveal S3 buckets indexed in search engines through patterns such as site:s3.amazonaws.com or keyword-based queries.

TCP NULL scanning is a stealth scanning technique covered in CEH v13 Reconnaissance and Network Scanning. In a NULL scan, all TCP flags are set to zero. According to RFC 793 and CEH documentation, closed ports must respond with a TCP RST (Reset) packet.

If the port is open, the target typically does not respond, making this technique useful for firewall evasion. Therefore:

RST response = Closed port

No response = Open or filtered port

Other options do not apply to NULL scans:

SYN/ACK is associated with SYN scans.

ICMP errors may indicate filtering, not port state.

This scenario primarily simulates dumpster diving because the key action involves retrieving sensitive information from discarded materials and then using it to gain access. In CEH social engineering coverage, dumpster diving is a physical information-gathering technique where an attacker searches trash, recycling bins, unsecured disposal containers, or shredding waste to find documents and artifacts that can be exploited. Common targets include access codes, employee directories, printed emails, shipping labels, invoices, internal memos, and partially shredded documents—exactly what Priya finds in the unsecured maintenance container. The question even emphasizes “discarded packaging,” “shipping labels,” “shredded office material,” and a “crumpled document listing temporary access codes,” which are classic dumpster-diving indicators.

The later use of recovered access codes to enter the break room is the impact of the dumpster-diving phase, but the primary social engineering technique tested is how improper disposal leads to compromise. Tailgating would involve following an authorized person through a secure door without proper authentication. Eavesdropping refers to listening in on conversations or communications to capture sensitive information. Shoulder surfing involves visually observing someone’s screen or keyboard while they enter credentials or view confidential data. None of those describe the initial method of obtaining the access codes.

CEH-aligned mitigations include enforcing clean-desk and secure disposal policies, using locked disposal bins, shredding sensitive documents properly with secure destruction processes, training staff on handling printed data, and restricting access to loading docks and waste areas. Regular audits of disposal practices and physical security checks reduce the likelihood that attackers can harvest usable access details from trash.

CEH v13 describes Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) as an attack in which an authenticated user ' s browser is tricked into submitting unauthorized actions to a trusted application without the user ' s intent. CSRF exploits the fact that browsers automatically include stored session cookies when sending requests to a domain the user is logged into. In this scenario, the attacker creates a malicious form that triggers an unwanted funds transfer. Since the application does not validate request origin, enforce CSRF tokens, or require secondary verification, it processes the attacker ' s forged request as if it came legitimately from the victim. CEH emphasizes that CSRF differs from XSS because no malicious script executes on the target website; instead, the attacker leverages the victim’s authenticated session. This is distinct from session fixation (Option A), replay attacks (Option B), and XSS (Option D). The described behavior aligns precisely with CSRF exploitation.

The capability described—administrators instantly provisioning servers, storage, and compute through a web portal without needing the provider to manually intervene—is the NIST cloud characteristic called on-demand self-service. In NIST’s cloud computing model, on-demand self-service means a consumer can unilaterally provision computing capabilities (such as server time and network storage) as needed automatically, without requiring human interaction with each service provider.

The scenario explicitly highlights that the admins can scale resources “instantly” through a dashboard and that there is “no manual involvement from the cloud provider.” That is exactly what on-demand self-service captures: rapid provisioning driven by the customer through automated orchestration and APIs/portals.

Why the other options are not the best match:

Broad network access (D) means cloud capabilities are available over the network and accessed through standard mechanisms by heterogeneous platforms (mobile, laptops, workstations). While the dashboard is accessed over the network, broad access is about reachability and standard access mechanisms, not the self-provisioning behavior.

Resource pooling (C) refers to the provider’s multi-tenant model where physical/virtual resources are pooled and dynamically assigned; it explains how the provider can offer elasticity, but the user-facing “provision it yourself” aspect is on-demand self-service.

Measured service (B) refers to metering and monitoring resource usage for billing/optimization; it doesn’t explain instant self-provisioning.

Therefore, the characteristic is A. On-demand self-service.

The correct answer is C. Regenerate the session ID after a successful login.

The scenario describes session fixation. In a session fixation attack, the attacker causes the victim to use a known session identifier before authentication. After the victim successfully logs in, the application continues using the same session ID, allowing the attacker to reuse that fixed value.

CEH-aligned session hijacking material explains that session fixation allows an attacker to provide a valid session ID and force the victim’s browser to use it. After the victim logs in, the web server continues the same session, and the attacker can use the known session ID to access the legitimate user account . CEH web application material also states that if an application uses the same session ID before and after login, it can result in session fixation; therefore, the application must generate a new session ID before and after login and invalidate the old one on termination .

Option A is incorrect because cache directives reduce caching of sensitive responses but do not prevent fixed session IDs.

Option B is incorrect because SSL/TLS protects traffic in transit, but it does not stop an attacker from pre-setting a session identifier.

Option D can reduce exposure, but the direct and standard countermeasure is regenerating the session ID after successful authentication.

Therefore, the best answer is C. Regenerate the session ID after a successful login.

The CEH Mobile Platform Security module explains that mobile antivirus solutions rely heavily on signatures and known exploit patterns. A custom exploit with obfuscation is far more likely to bypass detection.

CEH explicitly teaches that:

Zero-day or unpatched vulnerabilities

Custom, obfuscated payloads

Minimal use of known frameworks

are the most effective for bypassing endpoint defenses during controlled testing.

Option A is correct.

Options B and C are easily detected.

Option D is social engineering, not a technical exploit.

The correct answer is A. Website Mirroring.

The scenario describes downloading publicly accessible pages, scripts, media files, and directory references so the team can analyze the site offline. This is exactly website mirroring.

CEH-aligned material explains that mirroring a website means copying the entire website to a local system. The downloaded copy allows the tester to inspect directory structure and identify vulnerabilities in an offline environment, reducing repeated interaction with the live web server . The same material lists website mirroring tools such as WinHTTrack, SurfOffline, BlackWidow, Teleport Pro, Offline Explorer, and Wget .

Option B. Information Gathering is broader and can include many collection methods, but the specific activity described is local copying of site content.

Option C. Web Server Footprinting focuses more on server details such as banners, technologies, operating system, and architecture.

Option D. Vulnerability Scanning is incorrect because the team is not yet actively testing for known vulnerabilities.

Therefore, the best answer is A. Website Mirroring.