Pass the PRMIA PRM Certification 8011 Questions and answers with ExamsMirror

The ISDA MA provides a template that can be used by market participants to document derivative transactions. It has a core section that applies always, and various schedules that can be agreed to by the parties. The ISDA MA considerably facilitates closing transactions once the ISDA MA has been has been negotiated, without requiring a renegotiation each time.

A key feature of the ISDA MA is that it binds all transactions into a single net obligation. The ISDA Master 2002 states that "All transactions are entered into in reliance on the fact that this Master Agreement and all Confirmations form a single agreement between the parties ... and the parties would not otherwise enter into any Transactions." Therefore transactions under the ISDA MA are not considered separate obligations.

The ISDA MA does indeed define close out processes, default and termination events, and the CSA is one of the parts of the MA that describes the collateral related agreement.

According to ISDA, a credit event is an event linked to the deteriorating credit worthiness of an underlying reference entity in a credit derivative. The occurrence of a credit event usually triggers full or partial termination of the transaction and a payment from protection seller to protection buyer. Credit events include

- bankruptcy,

- failure to pay,

- restructuring,

- obligation acceleration,

- obligation default and

- repudiation/moratorium.

A rating downgrade is not a credit event.

It is not generally sufficient to ensure the adequacy of liquidity across a group - ie it is not appropriate to just add up the sources and needs for liquidity across multiple entities in a group. This is because there can be restrictions on transferring liquidity between entities, particularly when the entities are located across borders. In cases where transfers of liquidity are permitted, there may be settlement delays in transferring funds from one entity to another. Therefore both statements I and II are incorrect.

Wholesale funding sources refers to the temporary interbank funding sources that need to be rolled over on very short intervals, often as short as overnight. These are not stable sources for long term funding. Statement III is therefore false.

Statement IV is correct as funding diversification refers to diversification of both funding sources and the duration for which the amounts are borrowed, ie tenor diversity.

Statement IV is the only correct statement and therefore Choice 'a' is the correct answer.

EDFs are derived from the distance to default. The distance to default is the number of standard deviations that expected asset values are away from the default point, which itself is defined as short term debt plus half of the long term debt. Therefore debt levels affect the EDF. Similarly, assetvalues are estimated using equity prices. Therefore market capitalization affects EDF calculations. Asset volatilities are the standard deviation that form a place in the denominator in the distance to default calculations. Therefore asset volatility affects EDF too. The risk free rate is not directly factored in any of these calculations (except of course, one could argue that the level of interest rates may impact equity values or the discounted values of future cash flows, but that is a second order effect). Therefore Choice 'b' is the correct answer.

Strong management of collateral, both receivable and payable, is emerging as an area requiring significant investment by financial institutions and asset managers in IT infrastructures and business processes. A bank needs to make collateral calls daily, based upon the P&L of the previous day, and likewise receives collateral calls from its counterparties. Just like cash, a bank needs to make sure that it does not run out of collateral to post when a call is received. Interestingly, based upon the agreements between banks and their mutual understanding, only certain types of instruments often qualify as valid collateral - and in such cases even cash is not acceptable if the right type of bond or other agreed security is not available to post. The operational challenges of managing collateral increase manifold due to 'rehypothecation', ie when collateral received from one counterparty gets posted out as collateral where it is due. In such cases, the bank should have the mechanisms to receive the right assets back in a timely way in case rehypothecated assets are to be returned. The systems should be able to deal with delays, failures without impacting the ability of the bank to post collateral as needed. All of this requires major investments in IT and processes.

Statement I is not true as a bank is bound to post collateral to third parties when needed regardless of the failure of its counterparties to post collateral to it when owed. In the markets, failures by counterparties can and do happen, and a collateral management system needs to account for and keep a buffer for the fact that some collateral when due will not be received.

Statement II is not true as rehypothecation by counterparties of collateral posted increases the chances of the collateral not being received in time. The system should consider the need for liquidity to generate assets that can be posted as collateral when others have failed to return the collateral in a timely way.

Statement III is not correct as cash may not be acceptable to counterparties as collateral. From a practical point of view, they may not have the infrastructure to receive and account for cash as collateral. A Swiss bank, for example, may have an 'account' to receive US t-bills as collateral but may not even have a US dollar account to receive cash. Even if it did, the volumes of transactions going back and forth may make tracking and reconciliations impossible. Thus a bank should always make sure that it has the right type of collateral available to post.

Statement IV is incorrect as well, as treasury issued instruments are also subject to haircuts. Their value also fluctuates in response to changes in yields, and therefore they are subject to haircuts as well.

Thus none of the statements are correct and Choice 'd' is the correct answer.

The VaR for a spot FX position is merely a function of the standard deviation of the exchange rate. If V be the value of the position (in this case, EUR 15m x 1.5 = USD 22.5m), z the appropriate z value associated with the level of confidence desired, and σ be the standard deviation of the portfolio, the VaR is given by ZσV.

In this case, the 10-day standard deviation is given by SQRT(10/250)*16%. Therefore the VaR is =1.645*15*1.5*(16%*SQRT(10/250)) = USD 1.1844m. Choice 'c' is the correct answer.

The BCBS publication 'Principles for sound stress testing practices and supervision' (May 2009) identifies all of the above as risks that were covered in insufficient detail in most stress tests prior to the current crisis. Therefore Choice 'd' is the correct answer.

For the PRM exam, you should have read this document. You should also be familiar with all the above risk types as being contributors to the crisis, and know what each of these mean.

With the passage of time, the range of possible values the FX contract can take increases. Therefore the maximum value of the contract, which is when the credit risk would be maximum, would be at maturity. (Note that this is different than an interest rate swap whose value at maturity approaches zero.) Therefore Choice 'a' is the correct answer and the others are incorrect.

Statement I is not correct as VaR does not set an upper limit on losses. In this case, the bank expects the losses to exceed $253m 5% of the times, and the VaR number does not indicate any theoretical maximum amount of losses.Statement II is incorrect as there is a 95% (and not 5%) probability that the bank's losses will not exceed $253mStatement III is correct and describes VaR.Statement IV is incorrect, as regulatory capital is a more complex computation for which VaR is only one of the various input.Therefore Choice 'b' is the correct answer.

The correct answer is Choice 'c'. The other choices do not refer to 'regulatory arbitrage'.